What鈥檚 a CEO鈥檚 incentive to go beyond their earnings per share goals? New 绿帽社 research has the answer
School of Management Assistant Professor Jason Xiao investigates the link between a company's earnings-per-share targets and CEO pay
A CEO鈥檚 bonus pay can often be linked with the company鈥檚 ability to meet its targeted earnings per share (EPS) goal. But when the market analysts project a company鈥檚 EPS to exceed what鈥檚 set in its internal goal, does the CEO have an incentive to reach above and beyond?
For those who keep close tabs on corporate finance, that might sound like a basic question.
However, according to from the 绿帽社 School of Management, the answer can be a bit more layered.
Researchers found that regardless of whether the analysts鈥 EPS forecasts were higher or lower than a company鈥檚 internal goals, most CEOs aimed to exceed the forecast amount. In contrast, CEOs would typically only achieve an internal goal if it fell below the analysts鈥 forecasts. This suggests that the internal EPS goal was accomplished more as an incidental byproduct of meeting the higher forecasted amount.
The takeaway: CEOs place greater weight on achieving analysts鈥 EPS forecasts than on achieving internal bonus plan goals, even if it means leaving some potential bonus money on the table.
鈥淎n underlying idea is that you don鈥檛 want to outperform your targets by too much because if you do, you鈥檝e raised the bar higher for the next year,鈥 said Jason Xiao, assistant professor of accounting, who conducted the study alongside other researchers.
鈥淐onversations about this subject generally center on whether CEOs are paid too much,鈥 Xiao said, 鈥渟o if you鈥檙e going to give them a certain payment scheme, you should incentivize them by setting goals that work in the best interest of the company and shareholders.鈥
One way to accomplish that could be to tweak the CEO鈥檚 compensation contract to clearly reflect how they strive for the analysts鈥 forecasts more heavily than the internal targets, according to the research.
The study examined CEO payment disclosures from 276 unique firms from 2006 through 2020.
Based on that, Xiao said, researchers collected data from nearly 1,000 observations with the same or similar EPS computations for analysts鈥 forecasts and the CEOs鈥 bonus plan objectives. This requirement allowed for a fair comparison of EPS levels between analysts鈥 forecasts and firms鈥 bonus plan goals.
The research found that if a company鈥檚 internal EPS target proved higher than the EPS projected by market analysts, CEOs would primarily aim to achieve only the lower forecasted EPS amount.
While CEOs鈥 bonus pay may be based on earnings per share, Xiao said, a significant portion of their compensation often depends on the firm鈥檚 stock price. An important factor in determining stock price is whether or not the company can beat the analyst forecast.
鈥淚f they have more of their pay tied to that forecast, as opposed to the internal type of targets, they鈥檒l care more about the analysts鈥 amount,鈥 Xiao said. 鈥淏ased on this finding, we felt it demonstrates the importance of considering both types of pay together because only then would you more clearly understand that CEOs often hit their internal target only while on their way to hitting the other one.鈥